Why does Hillel choose “What is hateful to you, do not do unto your neighbor” as his version of “the entire Torah?” Why not “Love God” or “Keep mitzvoth.” HiIlel’s tenet is never actually mentioned in the Torah itself.

 

Rabbi Shmuel Eidels (generally known by his acronym Maharsha), a major Talmudist of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, points out that the essence of the non-Jew’s request was a desire to find the one fundamental principle upon which the whole Torah system was based. Hillel’s answer, thus, was not an expression of the entire Torah but rather his understanding of this one singular, fundamental principle upon which the whole Torah is built. The challenge still exists, though: how could this be a statement of the Torah’s fundamental principle given that it seems to ignore the commandments related to the religious side of Torah such as loving God. Seemingly bothered by this very concern, Rashi actually presents one understanding of the statement as not referring to one’s human neighbour but rather one’s Divine neighbour. Essentially, according to this view, Hillel is basically saying that the fundamental principle of Torah is, actually as you suggest, “Keep mitzvot.” As you would not like something hateful done to you -- as you would not like to be ignored -- do not do to your Divine neighbour -- namely do not ignore God through not observing His mitzvot. Hillel is, according to this view, informing the non-Jew that the fundamental principle of Torah is to follow the Will of God through the observance of all mitzvot, both those between Man and God as well as those between Man and Man. With this explanation, the statement could indeed be understood as reflecting a principle fundamental to the entire Torah.

 

A problem with this explanation, however, may exist in that it could be argued that it is a bit of a stretch to understand the word neighbour as the Divine neighbour. A simple reading of the statement would seem to better imply that Hillel was talking about human neighbours. There is a general principle that when Rashi presents two explanations it is usually because he finds there to be a weakness in each one independently. In this case, Rashi actually does present a second explanation, implying that he too had some difficulty with his first answer perhaps because of this stretch. Maintaining the simple meaning of the words, namely that neighbour means human neighbour, in his second explanation, though again raises the problem of how could this principle regarding human relations serve also as the fundamental principle for the specifically, religious mitzvot. One possibility is that Hillel, recognizing that he could not give one fundamental principle for all the mitzvot of the Torah, was really only trying to present the fundamental principle for the societal mitzvot. The weakness with this answer is, obviously, in that it did not truly meet the non-Jew’s request. This would explain why Rashi also presented his first explanation although he felt that with that answer there was the weakness of the stretched language.

 

Is there, though, a possible way of understanding the gemara as referring to human neighbours while still also maintaining that this principle can serve as the singular, fundamental principle of the entire Torah. Maharsha queries why Hillel presented his statement in the negative – don’t do to your neighbour what you would not like done to yourself – and doesn’t just quote the positive verse of “love your neighbour as yourself” found in Vayikra 19:18. He explains that a true investigation of this verse would reveal that it actually is also only presenting what we may term the negative demand; what Hillel was actually doing was presenting the real essence of the idea. The call upon the human being cannot be in the positive to treat another just like oneself for one has an obligation to take care of oneself first. (See Vayikra 25:36 as explained in T.B. Baba Metzia 62a.) It is also contrary to human nature to demand an individual to treat everyone as one treats oneself. If I buy myself a car, am I expected to buy everyone else a car? If I give a present to my child, am I expected to give similar presents to all children? Reality demands that we accept a responsibility for self and act within the parameters of this concern. While the Torah clearly perceives there to be a value in chessed and demands of us to exhibit this quality and assist others to the proper extent possible, its first and foremost demand is that we respect the other’s responsibility for self and not impede upon it just as we would wish others to respect our responsibility for ourselves and not impede upon it. This latter demand is actually Hillel’s fundamental statement – not to do to the other what you do not want done to yourself.

 

Within this context, Hillel’s statement could actually be understood in a much broader way as to encapsulate the proper attitude that one should have within life. There is clearly a value in chessed, in helping others. But there is a more primary value in sensitivity, in being aware of the world around you and ensuring that you, at least, do not harm others. Viewed this way, we can understand how this perspective could affect all aspects of life, not just what we may term the societal areas of the law but even within the areas of our religious endeavours. Be sensitive to ensure that you do not cause harm, is the fundamental principle upon which all else is built.

 

This now leads to the final phrase of Hillel’s statement (which was actually not included in the original question posed on this site). Hillel concludes by telling the potential proselyte, after articulating that one should not do to others what one would find harmful to oneself, that all else is commentary, now go study. It is one thing to have a simple statement of a fundamental principle; it is another thing to think that one can apply such a statement simplistically in the reality of this complex world. Hillel is adding in his very formulation of his fundamental principle that to fully understand this principle one must accept the challenge of study, with the recognition of the further challenge that one continuously faces in balancing one’s rights and obligations with another’s rights and obligations. This takes a lifetime of study and application.

 

This would also explain why Hillel’s statement is not “actually mentioned in the Torah itself”. The Written Torah is not the end statement of Jewish Thought or Ethics. It is the beginning statement from which we are, through the study of the Oral Law (also a product of the Divine origin of Sinai) to advance these teachings. Hillel’s statement was such a step. His end charge was then to take his step and further build upon it within the edifice of Torah.

 

Hillel chose “What is hateful to you do not do unto your neighbor” as his version of “the entire Torah” because at heart, Judaism is a religion based on a system of laws created to build community. All people need some rules and regulation to help them get along with each other, and most of Jewish law has to do with “ben adman l’chavero,” laws between two people. If you boil down the essence of all of these laws, you get, “what is hateful to you do not do unto your neighbor.” By following this simple advice, people would get along better with each other, fights and wars would not break out, and communities would flourish and grow. Now, if only we could always follow this simple wisdom!

I invite you to try to live by Hillel’s behavioral tenet while also engaging in Torah study, and see whether you think it not a brilliant response to the proselyte’s question!