In his extensive four-volume Hebrew study of the history of Jewish education, Simhah Assaf cites hundreds of sources from a wide variety of Jewish communities that show just how important it was to inculcate Jewish children with the means of living their lives as knowledgeable and committed Jews.  These sources include the syllabi and curricula of Jewish schools, teaching standards, evaluative techniques and more.  The reader will notice, however, that the goals in formal Jewish education were to convey information (i.e. teach texts and their meaning) and to provide the practical means for earning a living.  Jewish values were not taught apart from texts and skills but were incorporated in them.  For example, students learning texts about returning lost property will ineluctably learn about respect for another’s property, conflict resolution, personal responsibility, etc.   And students learning about how Moses instructed Joshua to carry out God’s command to attack the Midianites and destroy them rather than do so himself because Moses took refuge in Midian, would also learn the principle that one never forgets a favour.  Yet, there is evidence to suggest that values were not always successfully learned or that the subject was too sensitive to teach.  For example, the Talmud (Berakhot 62a) reports how a certain student hid under his teacher’s marital bed to learn about sexual intimacy.   Clearly, sex education was not part of formal rabbinic studies. 

Parents share in teaching their children.  In fact, according to the Torah, parents are the primary educators.  But not every parent is equipped to succeed in the endeavour and not every method is going to work.  Object lessons are sometimes useful and so are physical exhibits.   However, care must be taken not to cancel the promotion of one value at the expense of another.  Judaism advocates a strict observance of the principle of respect for the dead.  So displaying a miscarried fetus may have some educational value in teaching about child development and even sexual responsibility, but it comes close to undermining the value of respect for human remains.  Jewish parents may avail themselves of the many books on the market that are less graphic yet equally efficacious in teaching about fetal development.  More importantly, Jewish parents should verbalize that sexual activity is not simply a matter of knowing the “plumbimg” but in having self-discipline as well as respect for others and the sanctity of human relations.   

The Talmud (Yoma 38a) reports on what might be considered the first recorded strike in human history.  The House of Garmu held the secret of how to prepare the show-bread that was prepared for the Temple.  They refused to perform their function unless they received higher wages.  In order to break the strike and end their monopoly, other workers were brought in but the substitutes were not as competent and unable to reproduce the same quality bread.  Ultimately, the House of Garmu returned to their jobs.

It is particularly since the establishment of the modern state of Israel that workers rights have intersected with essential services.  That is to say, should utility workers strike, the entire State may be in jeopardy and the needs of the majority cannot be trumped by the demands of the minority.  (See Moshe Silberg’s excellent study Talmudic Law and the Modern State.) Workers rights to organize has been validated by sources as early as Maimonides (Laws of Sale 14:10) and as recent as Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 1:58, 59).  Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook orally ruled that workers in Israel have a right to organize, press for better working conditions, and even strike if necessary.  Yet Rav Kook and Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg advocated submitting any labour dispute to a rabbinic court for resolution.  It seems as if rabbinical authority anticipated that some matters have grave consequences and cannot be held hostage by demanding workers. 

In effect, workers benefits and communal services must be fairly balanced.

Having recently returned from Israel, I am pleased to report that our prayers have been answered.  Mt. Hermon was covered in 30 cm of snow and most of Israel received a significant amount of rainfall.  The aquifers are being renewed and Lake Kinneret has risen by 3 cm thus averted the impending ecological disaster.

Jews praying for rain in times of drought is not a new phenomenon.  It dates back to the early rabbinic period some two millennia ago. The Mishnah Ta’anit is preoccupied with just this procedure.  Prayer and fasting and the blowing of the shofar are all included the rituals to combat drought.

The underlying religious doctrine, however, is more complicated.  The Torah (Deuteronomy 11) teaches that the withholding of rain is a direct result of national infidelity.  In other words, drought is a consequence of sin.  Hence, the remedy for drought is not prayer but repentance.  Presumably, the rituals mentioned in the Mishnah are predicated on adequate repentance.  However, if, as our tradition teaches, the sum total of annual rainfall is predetermined by God at Sukkot, then no subsequent prayers or procedures should be able to change that fact.  Otherwise, a significant theological challenge would result.  If God’s decision on rainfall can be changed by prayer it suggests that God did not anticipate the possibility that prayers would be offered and accepted, thus calling into question His omniscience.  Fortunately, our tradition has chosen to set aside this headache in favour of a favourable practical outcome.

The Conservative movement as a movement has not issued rulings on all aspects of Jewish life.  And even when decisions are made by the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly, they serve as guides for local rabbis to follow - or not - at their discretion.  To the best of my knowledge, hair covering by women has never been the subject of any ruling.  I can attest to the fact that there are indeed some women who affiliate with the Conservative movement who do cover their hair and I know some women who affiliate with the Orthodox movement who are lax in covering their hair.  Your question suggests that religious identity is determined by one’s dress (a uniform, so to speak) rather than by one’s beliefs or behaviour.  Nothing could be more fallacious.  (Incidentally, there are ample sources to suggest that hair covering is not a halakhic requirement. See my Perspectives on Jewish Law and Contemporary Issues, p. 369ff. and Michael Broyde, “Hair Covering and Jewish Law: Biblical and Objective or Rabbinic and Subjective?” Tradition 42:3, Fall 2009).  So covering your hair will not necessarily disenfranchise you from affiliation with the Conservative movement.  What will make a difference is why you choose to cover your hair.   Conservative Judaism is rooted in a scientific, historical, and critical – yet respectful and loving – approach to Jewish sources.

If, at the end of the day, after reviewing the sources and analyzing the relevant texts, you determine that the authorities mandating hair-covering are convincing, you are behaving as a Conservative Jew. 

Among the fundamental differences between Judaism and Christianity is the fact that Christians are obsessed with getting to heaven while Jews are preoccupied with making earthly life heavenly.  In other words, Judaism – pragmatically – is more concerned with the “here and now” rather than the “hereafter.”  Logically, that is easy to understand:  any statement regarding another plane of existence is speculative only.  There is no hard evidence to prove or disprove any view about the great beyond.  Consequently, Judaism prefers to act on doing those things that are in the domain of the possible rather than debate those things that are in the realm of the imaginative.

Having said all this, it would be wrong to conclude that Judaism has nothing to say about an afterlife or that the concept is foreign to Judaism.  Quite the contrary: belief in a “world to come” and its particular manifestations are discussed in the Talmud and Midrash, the Apocrypha, and Kabbalistic literature.  But the actual details are subject to wide differences of opinion. 

Positing a “world to come” offers an effective response to the thorny question of how evil exists in a world created by a good and all-powerful God.  Rather than conclude that God is neither all good nor all-powerful, belief in an afterlife allows for treating the question as one to be answered in due course.  What seems to be unjust in this world will be levelled in the next world.  If, in this world, good people suffer, in the next world they will be rewarded many times over.  And if, in this world, wicked people prosper, in the next world they will be punished many times over.

I would recommend reading Simcha Paull Raphael’s comprehensive book entitled Jewish Views of the Afterlife, published in 1996.

Sometimes directives are not to be followed.  There are higher principles at work and these principles trump personal choice. For example, if someone says to another “Torture me,” the imperative carries no weight and any listener would disregard the statement no matter the relationship between the two.  Philosophically, the reason is clear: our bodies are not our personal property to do with as we please.  Rather, they are on loan from God, as it were, and must be treated with the utmost reverence.  The reverence we give to the person extends even after death.  Here, the operative principle is “kavod ha-met.”  In light of this principle, a number of practices are contrary to Jewish law.  For example, leaving a body unattended, or mutilating a corpse, or embalming the dead, or viewing the body are all violations of the principle of “kavod ha-met.”  And so is cremation, regardless of any exceptions in early Jewish history.  The Jewish ideal is to return the body to the earth from which the very first human being was created (Genesis 3:19), bringing life full circle.  With all this in mind, the surviving family members must ignore the instructions previously given by the decedent and not cremate the body.   What may complicate things is the fact that not all the surviving family members may be in agreement and the fact that even after knowing what Judaism demands, the family may choose to ignore it.  Also keep in mind that many rabbis will not officiate at a funeral when cremation will ensue.

Even during Biblical times the prophets criticized those who mechanically participated in the sacrificial cult while oppressing the poor and ignoring the plight of widows and orphans.  The Book of Job is also illuminating.  While the rabbis held that Job was not a Jew, the issues in the text are issues with which Jews were grappling.  Thus when a friend of Job argues that perhaps his troubles resulted from a delinquency or deficiency in practice, he argues that he committed no ethical violation.  Not a single point of defence he offers affirms his ritual rigor but his virtue.  What the text comes to teach is that ethical behaviour is the measure of a worthy life.  But not everyone measures up.  So the disconnect you observe between the ideals of Judaism and what Jews actually practice is, unfortunately, an old and pervasive one.

Part of the problem lies in the phenomenon of compartmentalization by which people focus on one aspect of religious behaviour rather than observe all religious teachings holistically.  Thus some will be quite diligent in prayer and kashrut – areas that define a person’s relationship with God - but lax in areas that define interpersonal relationships.  Further, some have convinced themselves only those within their own insular community are worthy of being treated with respect and dignity.  The Talmud also recognized that sometimes we become victims of ethical inertia.  Once an illicit behaviour pattern sets in, it is difficult to break.  We simply become accustomed to doing what is wrong – like speeding or jaywalking.  And of course human nature plays a role.  We are fallible creatures who, while not born in sin, are easily corruptible.

The challenge, as you note, is to change all this.  It is not easy.  First, a person needs to be self-motivated.  Without an inner impulse to admit one’s failings and improve, there is little hope that change is possible.  In addition, a person must have the courage to remain true to his or her ideals despite the fact that others violate them.  Second, one needs a supportive community, that is, a community that insists on keeping to the standards of ethical conduct.  And third, one needs a program for transformation.  A revival in the teachings of Mussar is welcome.  Mussar was the program by which study and committed observance of Torah is supplemented with directions and insights for noble living.  Consider the illustrative story of the yeshivah student who boasted to his teacher that he had gone through the Talmud seven times only to hear his teacher ask how many times the Talmud has been through him.  In other words, the objective is not to acquire data but to be ethically improved.

An addendum: Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook once taught that the purely righteous do not complain against wickedness but add goodness.  Rather that bemoan what others are doing or not doing – actions outside our control – it is imperative that we look after how we can better ourselves.

I have not read the book so I can comment only on the news reports that have followed the publication of Torat HaMelekh in November 2009.  According to the report that appeared in the “Forward,” the authors, Rabbis Yitzhak Shapira and Yosef Elitzur, assert that the Torah’s prohibition against murder applies only to Jews who kill Jews.  The implication of this assertion is that there is no such prohibition against Jews killing non-Jews.  But that position would be hard to defend.  The Talmud (cf. Sanhedrin 57a) teaches that all innocent life is protected by Jewish law.  That is to say, unless there is clear evidence that a person is a wrong-doer, the taking of his or her life is prohibited.  At the very outset of his articulation of the laws regarding murder and the preservation of human life, Maimonides states categorically:  “Anyone who kills a human being violates the negative command ‘Do not murder.’”  Maimonides makes no distinction between Jews and non-Jews.  And the author of Sefer HaHinukh (Law 34), reputedly Rabbi Aaron Halevi, argues that killing any innocent human being defeats God’s plan of populating and civilizing the world.   Again, the author makes no distinction between Jews and non-Jews.  These few references are merely suggestive of the entire thrust of Jewish law is to understand that homicide applies to any human being (cf. George Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law, p.191).  If the rest of the book includes assertions that are as extravagant as this one, I would have little choice but to view it with the same disdain as many of the critics have already indicated.