Question: There is a big problem, noted again recently in the media, in the ultra-Orthodox community of not reporting child abusers and protecting them, rather than the victims. What can we do to stop this, get the criminals arrested, and protect the innocent victims? Does this reflect Jewish values, and is it in line with Jewish moral behavior?

Contemporary studies indicate that child abuse is a problem in the Jewish community, much as it is in many societies around the world.  As such, we Jews have a moral mandate to report all such incidents to the proper authorities.  Rabbi Elliot Dorff, a regular contributor to Jewish Values Online, has addressed the problem of not reporting child abuse in his JVO answer to this question: “Is there any legitimate basis today to the Jewish concept of mesirah (the prohibition to inform to a secular government) when it comes to child abusers/molesters? Either in Israel, or anywhere else in the world?”  That answer can be accessed through this link: http://www.jewishvaluesonline.org/rabbi.php?id=11 .

In that answer Rabbi Dorff refers to and quotes from his t’shuvah (responsum – a rabbinic response to a question of Jewish law) on family violence submitted to the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement’s Rabbinical Assembly.  That t’shuvah can be accessed by using this link:

http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19912000/dorff_violence.pdf .  A selection of that t’shuvah dealing specifically with child beating is included below, minus the footnotes which can be read in the complete text noted above.

Child Beating

If a man's wife was construed as his possession in the past, all the more so were his children - a tenet that is shared by American law and that only recently has been challenged in the court case of Gregory K. “‘Portable property’ was Emerson's term for children, and most people believe kids do belong to their parents, body and soul. As a practical matter, the courts have tended to uphold that view.”

Similarly, if discipline was the major justification for Maimonides for beating a wife, that rationale applies all the more for children - at least in some Jewish sources. “Spare the rod and spoil the child” has firm roots in the biblical Book of Proverbs:

“Do not withhold discipline from a child; if you beat him with a rod he will not die. Beat him with a rod and you will save him from the grave.” This is applied to mothers as well as fathers: “Rod and reproof produce wisdom, but a lad out of control is a disgrace to his mother.” Along these lines, the Rabbis specifically exempt parents and teachers from the monetary damages usually imposed on those who commit assault on the theory that beating a child is sometimes necessary to carry out the parental duty of teaching the child Torah in its widest sense, including the difference between right and wrong. (The teacher is, in the Rabbis' view, simply an agent to enable the parents to fulfill this responsibility of theirs.) Deuteronomy, the fifth book of the Torah, goes even further: it states that parents may bring a “wayward and defiant son, who does not heed his father and mother and does not obey them even after they discipline him” to the town elders to be stoned. In the latter case, of course, the physical damage to the child is to be inflicted by public authorities and not the parents, and that is a significant difference, but the parents are still the instigators of this procedure.

            One must immediately distinguish, though, between discipline of a child and child abuse. It is arguable whether striking a child is ever a good way to discipline a child, but if it is, that constitutes one end of a spectrum. Presumably, at that end the parent would hit the child only when the child's behavior was so unusually vile that, in the estimation of the parent, milder forms of reprimand would not work.

            At the other end of the spectrum is child abuse, wherein the parent's striking of the child is frequent, uncontrollable, unprovoked, and excessively severe. Hitting the child is not responsive to the child's behavior or needs, but rather acting out the parent's frustration. This occurs especially when the parent either does not understand the needs of the developing child or has expectations of behavior that do not match the child's capabilities. Parents also abuse children when they do not know alternative, effective methods of discipline. Striking the child, then, is the parent's misdirected attempt to calm his or her own inner anxiety and is either not responsive at all, or is not properly responsive, to the child's behavior in his or her social and developmental context.

            In between those extremes are cases in which the line between legitimate discipline and child abuse is harder to discern. Even granted such ambiguities in the middle of the spectrum, though, we surely have a problem in our society when ten to twenty percent of university students retrospectively report that as they were growing up, both they and other family members were beaten to the point of producing, at a minimum, bruises or bleeding.

            At most, then, verses like the ones from Proverbs cited above legitimate striking a child only for reasons of discipline, and then only when no milder form has been effective in correcting the child's behavior. We moderns, though, no longer think of children as the parents' property to do with as they will, but rather as the parents' blessings and the parents' responsibility to raise into moral, informed, caring, and productive adults. Moreover, we also now recognize that hitting a child is usually not the best way to accomplish those ends. Consequently, while we Conservative rabbis would acquiesce to a light smack on the buttocks (a “potch”) or even striking the child elsewhere on the body with an open hand (but not punching or pummeling with a fist), only those types of contact that do not produce bleeding or a bruise would be permissible. In contrast to the verses cited above from the Book of Proverbs and to the practice permitted in times past, however, we forbid striking a child with a rod. belt, or instrument of any kind. We also hereby declare that, as we interpret and apply the Jewish tradition in our day, it clearly and emphatically prohibits a parent's use of corporal punishment to the point of abuse - i.e., where the child is seriously harmed or where the punishment is clearly excessive as a response to the child's misdeed.

            After all is said and done, though, the use of corporal punishment, even within permissible parameters, is questionable. That same biblical Book of Proverbs that advocates the use of physical force in raising children also says, “Educate a child according to his own way.” The Talmud understands this to mean that parents should make age-appropriate demands so as not to put their children into a situation in which corporal punishment would be called for. In other words, parents have a duty to set reasonable standards for their children so as to avoid even being tempted to use physical forms of discipline. They must not put a stumbling block in the way of their children fulfilling the commandment of honoring them.

            Even in the worst of cases - the kind described by Deuteronomy - the Talmud could not accept anything like the death penalty. The Rabbis, therefore, legislated evidentiary procedures that made it impossible ever to attain a capital conviction in such a case. Once having created these barriers, they themselves said, “A wayward and defiant son [subject to execution according to Deut. 21:18-21] never was and never will be.” If the Rabbis insisted that even courts not go to the limit available to them under biblical law in physically punishing children, parents should certainly limit the physical punishment they inflict - or, even better, refrain from it altogether. After all, if the parents' duty is to teach the child proper behavior, they should not, in the process of doing so, do to the child exactly what they do not want the child to do to others. Educationally and pragmatically, then, as well as Jewishly, the best policy is not to use physical punishment at all.

            One especially troubling aspect of this picture occurs in instances where parents beat retarded children. While there is minimal justification for beating a normally intelligent child for purposes of discipline, retarded children often cannot even understand why they are being subjected to blows, and so the abuse loses much of its justificatory cover. One can understand the extra measure of frustration that parents might feel in raising a retarded child, and one can certainly appreciate the additional demands that that entails over those involved in rearing a child of normal intelligence, but parents of retarded children need to get help so that they can respond to those aspects of parenting their special-needs child in appropriate, non-violent ways.

            The same rules that apply to the discipline of children - but with even less endorsement for striking the child - apply to family-like situations outside the family where adults are in charge of children. Thus teachers, youth group leaders, counselors, coaches, and the like may, at the very most, give a light slap on the buttocks to children to get them out of bed or going to the next activity. They may not strike the child in any form of corporal punishment.

            None of the above, of course, is intended to prohibit hugging a child so as to comfort him or her or putting an arm around the child's shoulders as an expression of congratulations in, for example, a ball game. On the contrary, parents who refuse to hug their children or kiss them thereby deprive them of some of the most effective and needed forms of love. All of the above strictures, then, are with reference to acts of violence against the child, differentiated from acts of love or friendship by both the intention and context of the parties and the form and energy of the physical contact.

A thoroughgoing presentation of a Jewish approach to personal ethics can be found in Rabbi Elliot Dorff’s excellent work, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself (Jewish Publication Society, 2003).

Rabbi Joel Rembaum

Question: After the recent tragedy in France, many people are saying that Jews there should leave and move to Israel. Is there a value to staying in France and trying to improve the situation, or do Jews have an obligation to leave rather than put themselves in danger?

Jews do not have an obligation to leave France and move to Israel to save their lives.  France is not the FSU or an Arab country in which the government systematically harasses, threatens and physically and psychologically harms Jews.  The current French government is neither anti-Jewish nor anti-Israel.  In fact, the opposite is true, especially in comparison with the governments of other European countries.  French President Nicolas Sarkozy has Jewish roots and has publicly expressed his pride in them.  It would appear that this would actually be a good time for French Jews to actively engage the French national government and local government officials in launching a significant joint effort to enhance the security of French Jewry. 

The Toulouse tragedy was a horrific act of brutality, as were the murders of the three non-Jewish soldiers.  Without diminishing the problems posed by the unique situation that faces the Jews in France, with its large Muslim population, we must keep in mind that Jews could be targeted for acts of terror anywhere in the world, including Israel and the USA.  In fact, being in Israel is not a guarantee of safety and security – witness the rocket attacks on the cities in the south that threaten the lives of one million people, nearly twice the Jewish population of all of France.  And, the missile threat from the north, while not active at this moment, is real. 

If the Jews in France were under the same kind of threat the Jews of the FSU faced in the second half of the 20^th century, then world-wide Jewry would be under an obligation to try to rescue them, since this would be a matter of pidyon sh’vuyyim, redeeming captives.  This, however, is not the case.  It is, therefore, up to the French Jews to determine what, in their eyes, are the proportions of the threat to their well-being.  Many French Jews have purchased homes in Israel that they can use when they visit and that stand ready to receive them, should the situation in their country badly deteriorate.  At this point in time, French Jews should decide to move to Israel not because of the threat to their well being, but because Israel can offer them the kind of Jewish life experience they cannot get in the Diaspora.  Jewish young people should be taught about the amazing opportunities in Israel, as well as about the challenges the country faces after over 60 years of existence.  

There are efforts going on in France right now to mobilize French Jews to become stronger advocates for Israel.  This project includes lobbying the government on Israel’s behalf and becoming more vocal in the media.  Should these efforts succeed, the continuing presence of Jews in France would actually be to Israel’s benefit.  Let us pray that this program is successful.      

Rabbi Joel Rembaum

And God Said: Choose Life

Question: In the Torah, God promises prosperity if we keep the Torah and destruction if we violate it. But how can we still believe that, when we’ve seen over the centuries that our actions and our reward or punishment don’t always correlate?

The question revolves around the principle of God’s justice in rewarding goodness and punishing evil.  It is very clear that there are many places in the Bible where this is presented as a categorical truth.  So we read in Deuteronomy 11:13-21:

“If, then, you obey the commandments that I enjoin upon you this day…I will grant the rain for your land in season, the early rain and the late. You shall gather in your new grain and wine and oil….Take care not to be lured away to serve other gods and bow to them. For the Lord’s anger will flare up against you, and He will shut up the skies so that there will be no rain and the ground will not yield its produce….” 

Likewise, there are many passages in the books of the prophets where we find predictions of dire consequences – plague, destruction and exile – that are punishments for Israel’s sinfulness.   And, we read in the prophets and in Torah that if the people return to God their lot in life will improve and their relationship with God will be whole again.  Expressions of this faith in God’s justice reverberate throughout much of the Bible, especially when the fate of the Israelites as a collective is concerned.

There are, however, other places in Scripture where this notion of God’s perfect justice is challenged, particularly when the challenger is an individual.  The most powerful of such challenges is the book of Job.  There, in the first chapter we read (1:8): “The Lord said to the Adversary (the Satan), ‘Have you noticed My servant Job? There is no one like him on earth, a blameless and upright man who fears God and shuns evil!’”  The Satan then challenges God by arguing that Job is only righteous and God-fearing because he was blessed with a plethora of riches.  The Satan then taunts God, saying (1:11); “But lay Your hand upon all that he has and he will surely blaspheme You to Your face.”  God accepts the dare and lets the Adversary have his way with Job, as long as Job is not killed. 

We then read how Job suddenly loses all of his wealth and children and is then stricken with a horrible skin disease that keeps him in agony day and night.  Job asks that God put him out of his misery.  Three of his friends come to him, each trying to explain that God’s justice is perfect, and, therefore, Job must have done something to bring these calamities down upon him.  Job, however, maintains his innocence, and cries out to one of his friends (9:17-22): “He (God) wounds me much for no cause….I am blameless—I am distraught….He destroys the blameless and the guilty.” 

Near the end of the book God visits Job and tells him that he has no grounds to challenge God, because he cannot know God’s ways since God and his ways are beyond human comprehension.  In the end Job relents and God restores his health and wealth and gives him a more children.  Although Job realizes that he is “but dust” and cannot understand God’s ways, there is no declaration on his part that God is indeed just.  And, the image of God playing with someone’s life and allowing the killing of that person’s children just to put an obnoxious angel (Satan) in his place, makes God look like anything but a caring and just deity.

A similar note is struck in Psalm 22, where we read (22:2-3): “My God, my God, why have You abandoned me; why so far from delivering me and from my anguished roaring?  My God, I cry by day—You answer not; by night, and have no respite.”  Nowhere in the Psalm do we learn why this person is suffering, and nowhere is there an admission of guilt.  Like Job’s friends, the sufferer remembers how, in the past, God saved those who were downtrodden, and he affirms and proclaims his faith that God will do the same for him.  Here the speaker is more faithful than Job.  Nevertheless, the implication of the psalm is that God abandons people, and they have no idea why.  Again, God comes off looking like a capricious God who can be, even for a limited period of time, unconcerned for the well-being of his creatures.  This undercurrent of cynicism is found in a number of psalms and in Ecclesiastes (Kohelet), indicating that throughout the Biblical period the question that our questioner posed was being asked and is not new.

The Pharisees and the rabbis of the Midrash, Mishnah and Talmud sought to resolve the question by affirming that a person’s suffering or death here on Earth are not the end of that individual’s life experience.  There is a spiritual world, they taught, into which the righteous enter upon death that is filled with light and blessings that transcend any experience in this world.  So we read in Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 4:16: “Rabbi Yaakov would say: This world is comparable to the antechamber before the World to Come. Prepare yourself in the antechamber, so that you may enter the banquet hall.”  Life in this world should be lived in righteousness and holiness so that one can attain the reward of a high level of spiritual and moral purity that affords a meaningful segue into the next world. 

But then there arises the question: How can we explain the situation of people who live such a life of righteousness and yet spend their years in this world in suffering and misery?  Where is the justice in this?  Over the centuries rabbis have offered a number of answers to this question.  Here are some of them: 1. The suffering of the righteous is yissurin shel ahavah, afflictions of love.  As metal is purified and hardened by going through fire, so is the soul of a righteous person, especially beloved by God, purified and strengthened so it can rise to the highest levels of spirituality and draw even closer to God in the next world.  2. No person is perfect, and even the righteous person sins and requires punishment. Because God expects more from such a person, the punishments are more severe, and they ensure a noble entrance into heaven and the world to come. 3. The righteous suffer to atone for the sins of earlier generations who did not adequately repent for their sins.  God chooses the righteous because God knows that, due to the strength of their faith, they will bear their suffering without denying God and will set an example of faithfulness for others. 4. The answer with which the book of Job concludes: We cannot understand God’s ways, and we must maintain faith in God’s innate goodness  

I suggest that for many moderns, such answers may be inadequate.  We are more willing to accept the reality that often human actions – not acts of God – are the causes of human suffering.  We also understand that randomness continues to operate in the world, especially in the realm of nature.  Contrary to the ancients, most of us do not see in the destruction caused by storms, earthquakes and the like the hand of God punishing sinful humans.  We understand that if Americans choose to settle in “Tornado Alley” or near the San Andreas Fault with its seismic activity or along the southern Atlantic coast where hurricane activity is intense they should expect to be adversely affected by the consequences of their choice.  All of these natural phenomena are not extraordinary.  As the Talmud teaches: Ha-olam k’minhago noheg, “The world operates in its normal way.”  Why?  Perhaps someday we will figure that out.  The bottom line is – such activity reflects no judgment, one way or the other, by God on our activity.

Human misbehavior brings more grief into people’s lives than do natural disasters.  Over 60 million people died in World War II (and roughly 10% were Jews) and approximately 17 million died in World War I, for a combined total of 77 million.  Reasonable people attribute this to human activity and do not lay the blame on God.  This number is far greater than the total number of human beings who died in the 20^th century due to natural catastrophes (maximally 3.1 million from floods, storms, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc. – not including plagues and famines, in which human activity is a factor).  And yet, Jews ask: “Where was God during the Shoah.”  We ask this question because we are a covenant-based religion, and as such we believe we have a unique bond with God, who should have been present to save us.  But, we Jews forget that, according to Judaism, God also has a covenant with all humans through the Noahide Covenant.  Do we hear Jews asking, “Where was God during World War II?”  The bottom line is war is a human generated catastrophe.  It results in the loss of human life, the destruction of farmland, towns and cities, and the disruption of functioning societies.  It also wastes resources that could be put to use to cure disease, clean our polluted air and water, improve the education of our children, fight disease and promote health, reduce poverty and promote economic stability and growth.  

In addition to war, human immoral and unethical activity tears at the fabric of society, leading to multiple modes of social dysfunction.  Poverty, inadequate health care, poor education – all the results of social neglect – lead to consequences that affect all people, not only the poor, the sick and the ignorant.  Disrespect for others, their rights and their property generates crime and violence.  Hateful speech, gossip and lying can lead to the destruction of people’s reputations and to acts that destroy human life.  Human neglect and abuse of the natural world is causing climate change and literally changing the quality of ocean waters and can lead to new catastrophic natural events.  Is this God’s fault? 

Judaism is built on the principle that God gave humans free will.  Thus, we read in Deuteronomy 30:19, “I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day: I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse.  Choose life, if you and your offspring would live.”  So, humans make choices and must learn to live with the consequences – both good and bad – of those choices.  God cannot be blamed for the results of such decisions.  If a nation decides to cut back on funding education, and that nation suffers economic decline because its undereducated people cannot produce goods that compete in the world markets, do we really expect God to step in and fix the problem?  Hardly.  If Iran becomes a nuclear military power and the Saudis respond by building their own  nuclear weapons and tensions escalate and a nuclear holocaust occurs in the Middle East that engulfs the all the nations of that part of the world – including the State of Israel – are we going to blame God.  Hardly.  These are the bitter fruits of human free will gone awry. 

I suggest that a modern reading of our sacred sources requires a contemporary midrash that teaches that there are good and bad consequences to the choices humans – as individuals or as groups – make.  We read in Deuteronomy 11:26-28:

“See, this day I set before you blessing and curse: blessing, if you obey the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you this day; and curse, if you do not obey the commandments of the Lord your God….” 

God sets before us a table of amazing potentialities – love, compassion, justice, healing, beauty, food, water, knowledge, faith and more – and bids us to choose to make these potentialities into realities so that we can live lives of holiness and blessing in a world at peace.  If, however, we choose otherwise we have to expect that sooner or later, in one way or the other, dire consequences will confront us – and God will cry as His children suffer.

Rabbi Joel Rembaum

Attending an Intermarriage

I begin by responding to your question with another question: Have you spoken to your rabbi about this new wrinkle in your dilemma?  If not, perhaps you should, since he probably knows you (and your family situation) better than I or another rabbi who may be answering your question.  This is not to dismiss the importance of the opinion of an uninvolved person, which can, perhaps, be more objective.  Such an opinion may also be less relevant, because the respondent cannot take into consideration the subtle factors that are at work in the relationships within a family.  Perhaps getting your rabbi’s opinion and also considering those of other rabbis who are removed from the scene would give you sufficient information to allow you to make a more informed decision.

That having been said, I am compelled to ask yet another question: Does your brother fully understand your feelings regarding his intermarriage?  Surely, you have had plenty of time to share this with him.  If you have shared with him how troubled you are about his marriage to a non-Jew, you may be overly concerned about telling him the real reason why you will attend the wedding but the rest of your family will not.  It is a logical conclusion to how you have felt all along.  If you love one another as much as you say, should he not understand and be grateful that because of your love you will put your personal feelings aside to be with him? 

If, however, he does not know that you are deeply troubled about what he is doing – let alone about having your children witness the event – then I would say that your current concern is justified.  You may know that in Jewish tradition, telling a “white lie” so as not to hurt someone about whom we care can be justified.  A classic discussion regarding the propriety of telling a “white lie” is found the Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 16b – 17a: “Our Rabbis taught: How does one dance before the bride? Beit Shammai say: ‘The bride as she is’.  And Beit Hillel say: ‘A beautiful and graceful bride’!  Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: If she was lame or blind, does one say of her: ‘Beautiful and graceful bride’? The Torah, however, said, ‘Keep yourself far from a false matter’ (Exodus 23:7).  Beit Hillel said to Beth Shammai: According to your words, if one has made a bad purchase in the market, should one praise it in his eyes or deprecate it?  Surely, one should praise it in his eyes. Therefore, the Sages said: A person’s disposition should always be pleasant with people.” 

The law follows the opinion of Beth Hillel, and the upshot of this ruling is twofold: 1. It is permissible to tell a “white lie” if telling the absolute truth will hurt a person; and 2. telling such a benign falsehood can help a person to develop a pleasant disposition toward others.  Beit Shammai, nevertheless, has a good point – the Torah teaches us that we should distance ourselves from telling lies, and this teaching is unqualified.  One can imagine many valid reasons for their, and the Torah’s, opinion – among them being: telling lies can become a bad habit as a person slides down the slippery slope from benign lies to serious lies that can cause serious damage; and, one can never know how a lie can spin out of control, even if in its first telling it seemed harmless and justified.  

It appears to me that you are caught up in the second problem.  You have told your brother that your family’s non-attendance at the wedding is due to the cost of the airfare.  Your brother is now telling you that that is not an issue because he will cover your expenses.  Will you respond with yet another half-truth to avoid bringing them?  Will that lead to another falsehood? Will your brother eventually figure out that you have not been completely honest with him? Will that hurt him less than the truth?

Perhaps the best thing to do is to take him out for coffee and tell him that you love him very much and the last thing you want to do is to hurt him. Tell him that for this reason you have not been totally honest with him, but you now realize that continuing to walk on a path of falsehood can only backfire on both of you. Tell him that because you love him you are coming to his wedding, even though you do not agree with his decision to marry a non-Jew.  Tell him this has nothing to do with the character of his bride-to-be, but rather it is a principle that is very important to you and that you want to impart to your children.  Tell him this is the reason you do not want them to witness a ceremony that results in an intermarriage.  You must tell him that he and his wife will always be welcome in your home, and you hope the love he shares with your children will grow stronger over the years. 

This last point may seem inconsistent, because it could be argued that if your children see your brother and his wife often, they will come to accept the normalcy of an intermarriage.  There are, however, very cogent reasons why you should maintain and even intensify your relationship with your brother and his wife.  You note the importance of sh’lom bayyit, and this is a correct observation.  This involves not only your brother but your mother, as well.  Also, there is the matter of keruv, of bringing people closer to God and Torah.  You should consciously plan to have your brother and his wife in your home for Shabbat and Jewish holidays so they can experience the beauties of our tradition.  You never know, your sister-in-law may come to “see the light” and, on her own, decide to become Jewish.  And, your brother may come to an appreciation of his heritage that he never had before.  There are no guarantees that this will happen, but unless you follow this plan, you will never know.  And, in this way, your children will be able to see their uncle and aunt in a Jewish setting, and they can see how others find meaning in the traditions that are important to them (your children). 

So, perhaps the best thing to do is to “come clean” and stop having to hide behind a subterfuge.  There are risks involved, but are they any greater than the risks involved with hiding the truth?

Rabbi Joel Rembaum

What do you do when work ethics conflict with social responsibility?

A simple answer would be: Do not work for a company when you know that it produces or does something that you consider to be socially irresponsible.  For example, if you strongly opposed the last Iraq war because you felt that it was entered into under false pretenses – that is, Iraq was accused by the U. S. government of producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and you did not accept the legitimacy of the government’s evidence – then you should not have even considered seeking employment in a company that you knew produced equipment used in that war. 

If your training and economic need were such that employment in that company was the only option available to you, then, perhaps, you would have had to compromise your concerns regarding its participation in the war.  Since you, presumably, did not have available to you any top-secret information that would enable you to make an absolute judgment about the truth of the government’s claim regarding Iraq’s alleged WMD production, you would be compromising your judgment call, but not necessarily a truth. 

If, however, after you began work at that company, irrefutable evidence emerged that the government had lied regarding the WMD matter, you would have had to seriously consider quitting that job.  Staying in that position and intentionally doing substandard work, either to give vent to your ambivalence or to subvert the government’s war effort, would not have been an option, because you would have been engaging an unethical activity in order to respond to another unethical activity. 

From a Jewish perspective, this kind of response is a violation of a seminal ethical principle set forth in the teachings of Rabbi Simcha Bunim of Peshischa, (Poland,1765-1827), one of the great Hassidic Masters.  R. Simcha, in commenting on the passage in Deuteronomy 16:20, tzedek, tzedek tirdof, “righteousness (or justice), righteousness shall you pursue,” teaches us that the pursuit of righteousness must be accomplished righteously; that is – the means must be as ethically pure as the ends. R. Simcha’s principle resonated in the minds and souls of many subsequent interpreters of Torah and can be found referred to in the commentaries of the modern Hertz, Friedman and Etz Hayim/Lieber humashim.  The words of Deuteronomy 16:20 also evoked the following categorical statement by Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch in his T’rumat Tzvi Pentateuch commentary: “‘Justice – right’ – the shaping of all private and communal affairs in accordance with the requirements of God’s Law, is to be the one supreme goal sought purely for its own sake; a goal to which all other considerations must defer.”

Truth and justice cannot be sacrificed for the sake of social responsibility, because then we build on a foundation of injustice a society that is supposed to be responding to the needs of the masses of the people but that, ultimately, compromises the people's best interests.  A good example of this was the Former Soviet Union, in which the presumed advancement of the good of the many was achieved by sacrificing the civil rights of individuals and the very sanctity of human life.  The Soviet government acted immorally in order to create a society in which there was a “just” distribution of goods and services.  As a result, millions of lives were lost and an oppressive regime kept the masses in line through fear and acts of terror.  In sum, ethics that are based on truth, justice and righteousness must take precedence over social responsibility.

Rabbi Joel Rembaum

In the Jewish tradition, sexual intimacy between spouses is a mitzvah – a divinely mandated obligation – for the enhancement of the marital bond and for purposes of rearing children.  It is a blessed gift from the Almighty that is to be carefully nurtured and not misused.  So it is that we read in the Sefer Hasidism, attributed to R. Yehudah He-hasid of Germany (circa 1200), that the ideal in marriage is for a wife and a husband to satisfy each other sexually.  The Iggeret Ha-kodesh, The Sacred Epistle, written by a 13^th century Kabbalist (the exact identity of the author is not clear), offers an even more profound interpretation of human sexuality.  In an excellent article by Biti Roi, published online in the Jewish Women’s Archive sponsored Jewish Women, A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia (http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/iggeret-ha-kodesh), Roi presents the central theme of the Iggeret in this way: “The basic notion of the Iggeret ha-Kodesh is that sexual relations between husband and wife are sacred and that the state of both husband and wife during intimacy determines the character of the future child. The child’s nature and essence are determined by its parents’ spiritual consciousness and the holiness of their intentions at the time of conception. The opening of the work uses theological sources such as the creation story to strengthen the argument that intimacy is holy. The work then provides more detailed explanations on how to achieve such sanctity, measuring it according to five standards: the nature of the conjugal act, the time that it takes place, the diet of the couple, the act’s intentions and its quality.” While the author of the Iggeret has a uniquely focused mystical agenda – which Roi lucidly analyzes – it is clear that for him meaningfully and lovingly satisfying sexual activity is an important component of the marital bond.  The ecstasy of the sex act generates spiritual energy that transcends the physical realm and ascends into the realm of the divine.      

The traditional Jewish halakhic perspective on sexuality is very clear.  It is based on a Biblical passage in Exodus (21:10), which, according to the Sefer Ha-hinnukh on Exodus, law #46, mandates: “…whoever purchases a Hebrew maidservant and accepts her in designation for marriage, is not to leave her short of her [rightful] sh’er (food), k’sut (clothing) and ‘onah (conjugal intimacy).” As noted in Sefer Ha-hinnukh, rabbinic midrash extended these provisions to Jewish women in general.  Among the significant elements of the rabbinic tradition are: 1. Sexual activity is appropriate only within marriage.  2. It is the obligation of the husband to satisfy the sexual desires of his wife.  3. Sexual activity is necessary for the husband to fulfill his obligation to bear children.  4. Sexual activity cannot be coercive but must be consensual. 5. Sexual activity cannot be used as a means of manipulating one’s spouse for some ulterior motive.  Most modern interpreters of Jewish tradition would redefine the husband’s primary responsibility in these matters as being a responsibility shared by both spouses equally.  Further discussion of this matter can be found in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, Sefer Nashim (Book of [laws relating to] Women), Hilkhot Ishut (“Laws of Marriage”), chapter 12; Elliot N. Dorff, This is My Beloved, This is My Friend: A Rabbinic Letter on Intimate Relations (available at http://rabbinicalassembly.org/indexfl.html (be sure to write the title in the “search” space); and David M. Feldman, Marital Relations, Birth Control, and Abortion in Jewish Law.

Given all of the above, if a person has an addiction to “cybersex,” which means that it is more than an occasional surfing of pornographic websites but rather a serious expenditure of time and energy that is having a detrimental impact on that person’s life and his/her relationships with others – especially a spouse, then immediate remedial action is mandated by the principles of Jewish law and ethics.  Given the significant role sexual intimacy plays in a healthy marital relationship, addressing this illness – and that is how it ought to be approached – should be a top priority for the couple.  Appropriate psychological and medical counseling is called for, in which both the addict and his/her spouse participate; therapy, as prescribed by medical and psychological professionals, should begin as soon as possible and should be maintained with the same level of intensity and responsibility as any treatment for a serious illness; and both the addict and the spouse should work to replace the anger, frustration, guilt and hurt that have resulted from this problem with love, care, comfort, reassurance and patience.  Praying together and turning to God for strength should also be part of the regimen of rediscovering the beauty of loving intimacy with which God has gifted us.

Rabbi Joel Rembaum

Some religions probit drinking alcohol and consuming caffeine. Is there any similar prohibition in Judaism?

The short answer is: No, there is no similar prohibition in Judaism.  Consumption of alcohol and caffeine is permitted, and alcoholic drink, specifically wine, is the prescribed beverage for the celebration of Shabbat, the major festivals and various life cycle rituals, such as a wedding and a brit milah.  The operative controlling principle associated with ritual and casual drinking is moderation.

Rabbi Gershom Barnard, spiritual leader of Congregation B'nai Avraham - Northern Hills Synagogue in Cincinnati, in a sermon he posted online, provides us with a very thorough presentation of the variety of opinions on this subject.  I have excerpted key segments of his remarks which can be found below.  The full text of his comments can re read online at http://www.jacsweb.org/article-gershombarnard.html .  Additionally, Rabbi David Golinkin, President of the Schechter Institute in Jerusalem, has an enlightening responsum on the supposed “mitzvah” to drink excessively on Purim.  That paper can be found at http://judaism.about.com/od/purim/a/purim_golinkin.htm .  Both authors concur with the conclusions noted in the first paragraph, above.

Excerpted from: Rabbi Gershom Barnard: Judaism on Alcohol and Substance Abuse (1997)

Amid all the exciting stories in this morning's Torah portion - like the great flood and the Tower of Babel - a short passage in the middle is liable to be overlooked. That is chapter 9, verses 20 and 21: "Noah, the tiller of the soil, was the first to plant a vineyard. He drank of the wine and became drunk, and he uncovered himself within his tent." In its context in the Torah, this passage would seem to have two functions. One is to give an account of the beginning of viticulture, the cultivation of the grape vine and wine-making. The beginning of the Book of Genesis served our ancestors as an explanation of how various parts of their world came to be the way they were. The second function was to explain the relationships among various groups of people in terms of the behavior of Noah's sons, Shem, Ham, and Yaphet, toward their father when he was incapacitated. The different peoples of the Near East and its vicinity were supposed to be descended from Noah's sons, and the "pecking order", as understood by later Israelites, was established through this and other stories at the beginning of Sefer Bereshit. Our sages and commentators, besides explaining the matter of the sons' behavior, used the passage as an opportunity to comment on the problems associated with wine….

In presenting some Jewish religious teachings on the subject, let me first give you some halakhah (Jewish law) and then some aggadah (sayings or discursive material). There is nothing in Jewish law which prohibits the drinking of alcoholic beverages. In this respect, the rarity of Jewish teetotalers fits the tradition. Indeed, there are occasions when it might seem that drinking wine is required: kiddush at the beginning of Shabbat and Festivals, havdalah at their end, brises, weddings, and, of course, the seder. In fact, however, while there is a traditional preference for wine on such occasions, strictly speaking, grape juice may be used for any of them. This provision is very important to remember when we consider the dilemma of Jews with drinking problems, and it may keep us from airily dismissing arguments for total abstinence from alcohol….There are two occasions in the Jewish year when drinking in larger quantities might seem to be called for: Simhat Torah and Purim. The practice of drinking on Simha Torah is pure folklore, but, with regard to Purim, there is a passage in the Talmud, Megillah 7b, which holds that “On Purim a person should drink so much that he doesn't know the difference between ‘Blessed be Mordekhai and Cursed be Haman.’”  However, whatever that passage may have meant in the context of the Talmud, the main thrust of Jewish law is not to take it literally; we are never required to get drunk. There is a negative law concerning drinking. The priests in the ancient Temple were not allowed to drink when they were "on duty", and, by extension, rabbis are not supposed to give halakhic decisions while under the influence of alcohol. The reason is fairly obvious, but it is worth making explicit, because of something that I shall say later. It is that teachers of Judaism have to make distinctions, between the sacred and the profane, between the permitted and the forbidden. Anything which impairs the faculty of judgment, which leads to a breaking down of boundaries, is a problem.

While the Jewish laws specifically relating to drinking are important, I believe that a more general Jewish law is the most relevant teaching on this subject. That is that we are forbidden to do anything which is harmful or dangerous. To do so is to violate the Torah's commandment of shmirat hanefesh, taking care of oneself. This commandment clearly proscribes excessive drinking, drinking before driving, taking of other drugs, and many people would add smoking cigarettes to the list. I believe that is the essential teaching; this law covers the permissibility of moderate drinking in general, the problem of excessive drinking, the case of individuals for whom even moderate drinking may be harmful or situations in which any drinking is a problem, and the use all kinds of other chemical substances as well.

There are two other Jewish laws which apply to some special cases. One is the mitzvah not to put a stumbling block before the blind. This mitzvah has been understood to prohibit playing to anyone's weakness. It teaches us not to give alcohol to someone who has a drinking problem, and not to give it to someone who might be driving soon. The last legal principle which I shall mention is dina d'malkhuta dina, the law of the government is law. That is, it is against Jewish law to violate the law of the country. There are some exceptions to this principle, but its applicability here is that, whatever we may think about the use of marijuana and some other drugs, if they are illegal, then their use is against Jewish law as well.

Let me now turn to some broader Jewish teachings, to aggadah. On the one hand, we read in Psalm 104:15, "Wine makes the human heart rejoice", and this thought was carried further by the Talmud (Pesahim 109a), "there is no joy except in wine". On the other hand, one Ubar the Galilean commented on our original passage (Sanhedrin 70a): "There are 13 instances of the letters vav-yud (which spell vay, or woe - in Hebrew as well as Yiddish) in the passage dealing with Noah and the wine." In the Midrash Bemidbar Rabbah 10:6-7, we read that wherever there is wine, there are lust and immorality. These sayings, and many others in the same vein, are consistent with the guarded attitude toward alcohol conveyed by the halakhah.

Let us now broaden our focus further, and consider some very general aspects of Judaism. One is a general ethical principle propounded by Maimonides in his Shemoneh Perakim, the introduction to the commentary on Pirkey Avot. There, the Rambam, obviously influenced by Aristotle, states that the right path is usually found in the middle. For example, it consists of neither complete abstinence from alcohol nor drunkenness. The Rambam recognizes, however, that people who are sick (either in body or in soul), must deviate from the mean in order to compensate for their sickness. For example, alcoholics or people who have trouble with drinking have to minimize drinking or abstain altogether. The second general observation is based on the point which I mentioned above - that the reason for the prohibition of a rabbi's teaching while intoxicated is the necessity of maintaining distinctions and boundaries. [It should be noted that Rambam also writes, in his law code, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De’ot, 3:1, that a Nazir who has vowed, among other things, not to drink wine, must offer a sin offering at the conclusion of the period of his vow because he has sinned by abstaining from wine, which is s gift from God which we should enjoy (JR).] The most characteristic Jewish form of spirituality is not reaching for mystic communion with God, perhaps through altered states of consciousness, but rather living our daily lives with the understanding that we have various responsibilities to fulfill, both toward god and toward other people. Fulfilling our responsibilities, doing mitzvot, with the consciousness that the metzaveh, the commander, is God, is the most characteristic Jewish way of drawing close to God. This is a very sober approach to life, in more senses than one. The theoretical Jewish approach to drinking, therefore, is a quite consistent teaching of moderation.

 It is a Halakhic (Jewish legal) requirement to dispose of sacred scrolls, books, pages from such items or other sacred printed or written documents – especially those that contain any of God’s sacred names – in a Genizah, a space (a room, an attic, an underground storage area, a grave so designated, a grave of distinguished Jewish person into which sacred objects may be placed at the time of the person’s burial, etc.) set aside specifically for the purpose of such storage to ensure that the documents are not destroyed but are kept in perpetuity out of respect for their holiness and that of God and God’s name.  Other ritual objects that are deemed especially sacred, including tefillin, tallitot with their tzitziot (fringes) attached or tzitziot that have been removed from a tallit are also placed in a Genizah.  So the old haggadahs and booklets from undertakers with prayers must go into a Genizah.  The yarmukahs or kippot, however, have no sanctity associated with them, even though they are used for ritual purposes, and may be disposed of as you would any other article of clothing.

In his groundbreaking work, “With All Your Possessions,” Jewish Ethics and Economic Life, Meir Tamari cites three factors that define the Jewish understanding of employer-employee relationships:

“1. The employer – employee relationship is a specific instance of contractual rights and obligations binding free agents.  All legal factors applying to contracts – regarding, e.g., duress, withdrawal and litigation – apply here. 2. The worker is entitled to special protection regarding his wages and working conditions, over and above the normal legalisms regarding contracts.  Halakhic sources understood that as a result of his dependence on his wages, the worker is far more vulnerable to delays, legal snarls and sudden changes in the market place and has to be protected. At the same time, Judaism’s symmetry in justice is reflected in its insistence that the worker has obligations as well – primarily, to render honest value for wages received….  3. A major form of protection is that granted by custom.  Thus, custom usually provides the worker with fringe benefits over and above wages agreed upon, even where such benefits are not explicit in a contract (p. 129)."

We can, therefore, conclude that, according to the standards of Jewish tradition, if an employer, in order to avoid payment of unemployment benefits to a regular full-time worker who has met her/his work obligations, intentionally creates a hostile work environment to induce a worker to quit, the employer is in violation of the spirit and, depending upon the details of the work agreement, the letter of Jewish legal tradition.  

In the United States, however, the law of the land, and not Jewish law, determines how such matters are to be resolved.  And, clearly, if the employer and/or the employee are/is not Jewish, Jewish tradition can not be expected to have any relevance in the matter.  Moreover, Jews in the United States, a country in which principles of justice apply equally to all citizens, are obligated by Jewish law to abide by the law of the land (see Talmud Bavli: Nedarim 28a, Gittin 10b, etc. and later halakhic sources).  The only instance in which Jewish law could be brought into play would be if both the employer and the worker are Jewish and both agree to resolve the matter before a Beit Din, a rabbinic court, that can act as a court of arbitration whose decision would be binding if the two parties, in accordance with civil law, vested the court with such power.

Jewish tradition aside, if the worker, in a thoughtful and responsible manner, brings the issue of the hostile work environment to the attention of the employer in an effort to resolve the situation, and the employer responds favorably, well and good.  If the employer fails to ameliorate the situation and it remains as difficult as it was or gets worse, the worker has a number of choices.  As the questioner indicates, especially in the current employment environment, it may be wisest for the worker to “suck it up” and not quit, in the hope that the employer either backs off or fires him/her so unemployment benefits could kick in.  Another tack would be to turn to one of the many organizations that specialize in helping people in such a situation, either gratis or for a modest fee.  They can easily be accessed on-line.  A third option would be to try to get the employer to agree to mediation or civil arbitration.  Finally, the worker could consult a labor lawyer who could either advise the worker or represent him if a law suit is in order.  Litigation should be a last resort because of the time, stress and expense involved.

Rabbi Joel Rembaum