This is a most interesting question for it involves many side issues that need to be elucidated.

First, we must clarify the exact nature of the question as the two verbs that drive this question – ‘look for’ and ‘expect to see’ -- reflect two very distinct undertakings. The former is of a more active nature, asking of us, it would seem, whether we should be searching for Jewish values in the candidates. The latter would seem to be of a more passive nature, asking of us, it would seem, even if we should be able to identify Jewish values in the candidates. The further implication of this distinction could be in the role we assign to the integration of Jewish values in our evaluation of a candidate. The former, asking of us whether we should actively look for Jewish values in a candidate, would seem to imply that this should be an important criterion in our selection process. The latter, asking of us if we should even expect to see an integration of Jewish values in a candidate, would seem to imply that this, at least for pragmatic reasons, may not be a significant factor by which to render a decision. It would seem that before we even tackle what we may describe as the substantive question of the role of Jewish values in an election, we may have to consider the nature of the very relationship those outside of the Jewish world may have with Jewish values.

Second, of course, is the very issue of defining what Jewish values are. Regular readers of the Jewish Values Online website will no doubt recognize the powerful challenge this question presents for there are significant value differences between the branches of Judaism. I remember watching President Obama’s recent address to a convention of Reform Judaism, noting the powerful applause he received – and expected to receive – in response to certain comments. I also noted that if these same statements were made to a convention of Orthodox Judaism, the response to these very same statements would be the opposite and most negative. To those attending the Reform convention, the statements of President Obama would be presented as reflecting Jewish values; at an Orthodox convention they would be perceived to be attacking of Jewish values. So before we answer as to whether we should look for or expect to see Jewish values in US presidential candidates, we have to first define what we mean by Jewish values.

Continuing along this chain of thought, we may also wonder about what may even be the distinction between what we may term Jewish values and general universal values. When President Obama spoke at the Reform convention, he knew what to expect. There was no doubt that in the minds of the delegates – and perhaps even the President – there was a perception that he was maintaining Jewish values as defined within the parameters of Reform Judaism. Yet these values were not unique to Jewishness but reflected the values of many members of the general population. They could be said to reflect a certain perception of what would be a universal value consciousness. So the question is not simply what are Jewish values but also what makes these values distinctively Jewish so that they can be defined by this particular term.

It may be that we wish to describe certain values as Jewish because the root of such values emerged from the Jewish world; indeed many of the values within Western society did begin within the ancient Jewish world. Is this, though, what we now mean by the term Jewish values; they are the values that originated within the societal confines of the Jewish People? But so what? Why is it important for us to identify these Jewish values – except, perhaps, to feel the pride of being the originators? From his perspective, we may wonder why it would even be important to identify the Jewish values within a candidate. All that should really matter is whether we agree with his/her values regardless of their origin. We clearly would want to identify the values that are the basis for a candidate’s decisions – but why care if the origin is Jewish? We should just care if we agree or not.

There is, though, perhaps, another way of defining what we may mean by Jewish values that would reflect a more specific, and narrower, understanding of the term and could have a more specific relationship to the Jewish People – and thus could be of a more particular purpose to us. By the term Jewish value, we could be referring to positions that are favourable to the Jewish People. For example, in this context, the support of Israel could be considered a Jewish value. Our question in that case would then be whether we should look for or expect to see the assurance of such support in a US presidential election.

Again, in this context, the difference between ‘look for’ and ‘expect to see’ would be significant, but on the surface, we could offer a simple answer that we would clearly want a US presidential candidate to have such a value, i.e. a positive disposition toward the Jewish People. The exact nature of this support, though, may still be a question. There may be different ways by which a person could promote his/her support of the Jewish People, i.e. express such a Jewish value, with some positions expressing this stand being in conflict with others expressing this very same stand. It may actually be that two individuals, honestly declaring their support of the Jewish People, could adopt two diametrically opposite practical positions. Again we would be left with the need for us to determine our support for a candidate based upon our personal perceptions of the values maintained regardless of generic terms.

There is, however, one more point I would like to make in this regard and this is one that I offer specifically as an Orthodox rabbi. Maimonides, Shemona Perakim, Chapter 6 presents a distinction between two different types of mitzvot: Chukkot, the commandments whose sole basis is Revelation itself, and Mitzvot Sichliyot, the commandments which have a rational basis. For example, the prohibition of eating pork would be an example of the first category – the only reason we observe such a command is because God has so directed us. Maimonides goes so far as to state that we are not even to develop moral feelings in regard to such mitzvot – for example to feel that it is intrinsically disgusting to eat pork – but we are to even perceive that this action in itself is not problematic; we solely desist because that is God’s Will. An example of the second category would be the prohibition of murder. In regard to such directives, we are not only to abstain from such behaviour because God has so ordered us but we are also to feel the immorality of such an action. Unlike eating pork, we are to feel that murder is disgusting and inherently wrong.   

This recognition is, in my opinion, very important in the context of this question. There are times where we, as Jews bound by Torah commandments, may share certain standard conclusions with others yet would still not share the same moral structure and thought processes. There are cases where, for example, we may observe a certain standard because it is a chok even others from a different religious perspective may believe this standard to be a correct moral outlook – a view we may even find challenging to accept. It is thus important for us to recognize that, even as we may wish to define another as having a ‘Jewish value’ because we both share the same conclusion, this may not actually be the case. There still may be a wide chasm in underlying moral concepts.

The bottom line may be that there may be a point in looking for or expecting to see Jewish values in a US presidential candidate but there may be an even further point in being able to identify and articulate how we, as Jews, do not share underlying moral and ethical concepts with someone even as we may reach, for completely different reasons, the same action conclusion.

Of course, to properly answer this question, it is important for us to clearly define these two Halachic (Jewish Legal) terms that are being introduced, namely mesira and dina d’malkhuta dina. However, prior to this, it may first be important to understand the context in which these terms are applied.

Returning to the original question, we see that at issue is really this balancing of considerations. Mesira may be the term that is used to reflect the value in maintaining the independence of the Jewish community which may include a concern that Jews may not be treated fairly by members of the host society. Dina d’malkhuta dina may be the term that is used to reflect the value of respecting the laws of the land and the call to be good citizens especially in a land that not only has not been hostile to the Jewish community but has even been welcoming and supportive. Without knowing the specific case to which this rabbi made this statement, it is difficult to actually comment on the rabbi’s position. Similarly, it is difficult to state unequivocally that dina d’malkhuta dina clearly applies. I can only say that in regard to most of the recent cases where I have heard of such arguments, an argument of mesira would clearly not be normative. Considerations for the defaming of God’s Name (chilul Hashem) also are to become a factor in limiting charges of mesira. We are called upon to be good citizens – good members of the nation in which we live. We are also called upon to be good Jews – good members of the Jewish nation. The answer is not to pick one over the other but to attempt to accomplish both. In an environment where this would be possible, this clearly must be our goal.

When I first saw this question, I felt providing an answer would be pretty straightforward but as I drafted a response I began to realize that a proper answer would also demand the presentation of some basic principles of Jewish Law that are often not recognized. As such, allow me to begin by directing the reader to a good, basic response to this question by Rabbi Ari Z. Zivotofsky which can be found at the following link, http://www.kashrut.com/articles/glatt/#starstar. Now allow me to elaborate.

The word kosher in Hebrew means proper or fit and, in its more specific usage, declares that a piece of meat is permitted to be eaten according to Halacha, Jewish Law. In its more extended usage, it is also used to indicate that matters – be it a product, a program, an event – conforms to the requirements of Halacha. For example, I am a member of the Rabbinic Advisory Board of Koshertube (www.koshertube.com) where the term kosher indicates that the viewing of the videos on the site present no problem according to Halacha, namely that, according to the Jewish Law, they are fit to be viewed.

It is very important to recognize that kosher is, as such, a legal term and, thus, is similar to such terms as guilty or innocent. It does not reflect an attribute that is inherent in an item – such as dimension or colour – but reflects a judicial determination based upon facts and law. This is what a verdict such as guilty means; it is an evaluation that, pursuant to the accepted facts and the law as determined by those entrusted to make this decision, a person is guilty of a crime. Kosher is a similar, judicial conclusion. When someone declares an item to be kosher, one is stating that, based on the facts as presented to this person and this person’s determination of the appropriate halachic principle in this matter, an item is legally fit, in the case of meat that it is permitted to be eaten according to Jewish Law.

The technical case of glatt kosher may actually serve as a good example of the legal nature of such terms. There is a halachic principle that meat from an animal that would have died within one year is not kosher. An exact determination of whether an animal would have died within a year or not, especially after the animal has been slaughtered, could, obviously, be a most difficult one even for a veterinarian. This is where legal principles enter into the discussion. What exactly are the legal standards in this regard according to Jewish Law?  As one example of such a standard, there is a principle in the Halacha that we may apply the concept of rov, following the majority, resulting in that, without evidence to the contrary, we can assume that what applies to the majority applies to all. In this case of meat, the principle that is applied is not necessarily that of rov but of a similar nature, namely that we need be only concerned with issues that have a significant minority occurrence. What is a significant minority occurrence? That is a matter of legal disagreement. Based upon the study of Jewish, legal sources there is a debate between scholars of the Halacha as to the exact definition of this. This is a classic example of a disagreement within Jewish Law with which many people have problems. As with any legal system – in the same manner that you have differing conclusions of judges – there are scholarly disagreements about halachic principles. This is why you have many possible contradictory presentations of what is kosher or not – there are disagreements in law.

The technical, specific definition of glatt kosher concerns one of these disagreements. It is generally accepted that we need not be concerned with a possible malady in a slaughtered animal that would demand of us to label it ‘expected to die within a year’ and thus not kosher. We, thus, upon slaughter, generally do not examine an animal to see if there is some indication that it had such a malady. Such an occurrence is beyond a significant minority. There is one noted exception to this rule. There is enough of a significant minority occurrence of holes in the lungs of cows – which are life threatening – that it is a principle of Jewish Law that, before declaring the meat of a properly slaughtered cow to be kosher, an examination of the lungs has to occur.

This is where we get to the exact nature of glatt kosher. If a cow’s lungs are found to have a hole, the meat is not kosher. If a cow’s lungs are found to never have been punctured, we can determine, judicially, that the meat is kosher based upon the assumption that we do not have to be concerned about remote occurrences of other maladies. What, however, if the cow’s lungs were once punctured and were healed – or were within the process of being healed. We would be able to determine if this was the case by examining the lungs to see if there were adhesions on the lungs. Any evidence of an adhesion would indicate that the lungs were once perforated. In such cases, a decision in law is necessary to determine if this presents a halachic problem or not. Since an adhesion could indicate that there was once a hole in the lungs and, at that time, the cow could be defined as one expected to die within a year, the question is now whether, after the healing, that determination still stands.

When a cow, as such, is slaughtered, a cow’s lung is thus checked in these two manners. First, there is a physical determination whether there are any holes which, based on this fact, if found would result in a determination that the meat of this cow is not kosher. Then, there is an examination of the lungs to see if there are any adhesions. If there are, a further, judicial determination has to be made whether these adhesions present a problem. There is a disagreement amongst the scholars of the Halacha in this regard: do adhesions present a problem to a determination of kosher and, if so, which ones? The result would be that certain meat could be declared kosher by some halachic authorities while others would render it not kosher.

The term glatt kosher is actually a Yiddish term that technically refers to smooth lungs, lungs without any adhesions, and thus would be declared kosher by all authorities. When meat is said to be only kosher, and not glatt kosher, the presumed message is that there was an issue regarding the lungs but a determination was made to follow the authorities that would permit this type of adhesion although there would be some authorities who would not permit it. Someone choosing to only eat glatt kosher technically means someone who wishes not to enter this controversy and eat only meat that would be kosher to all the opinions (or, at least, an even greater number of them).

This leads us to the more colloquial use of the term. In reality, disagreements in the principles of Jewish Law exist in all areas of Halacha, in fact even extensively. As such, those who observe a halachic lifestyle are always making determinations of which positions in Jewish Law they observe. (This should not be perceived to arbitrary or, even, fully autonomous. There are further principles that are to be applied in this regard as well.) When someone applies the term glatt kosher beyond the case of cow’s meat (and, even, when the term is used, in some other ways, in regard to cow’s meat), what one is really saying is that they are attempting to be more stringent in their observance of the law through conduct that is acceptable to all opinions or the vast majority of them.

At the base of this question would seem to be an assumption that if Jewish individuals, groups or institutions are not imposed upon by a law, it is not their place, or there is no reason for them, to oppose this law. In terms of this specific case, it would seem that the one asking this question is assuming that since the New York state gay marriage bill will not cause any Jew to act contrary to his/her religious principles, there is no reason for Jews to oppose this law. Thus the question why a Jew would fight against this law. Is this assumption, however, correct? That is the real issue within this question.

Before commenting on this, we should, perhaps, first clearly outline Orthodox Judaism’s view of same-sex marriages. As is generally recognized, homosexual behaviour* is understood by Orthodoxy to be clearly prohibited by Torah law, both for Jews and for Non-Jews under the Seven Laws of Noah (the Noahide Code) which is deemed to be binding on all humanity. (In regard to this Code in general, see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim chapters 9 and 10; in regard to the specific prohibition regarding homosexual behaviour, see Halacha 9:5.) What many do not know, though, is that the institution of same-sex marriage is actually looked upon, within the literature, as an even lower form of immorality. See, for example, Rashi, Chullin 92b. See, also, Sifra, Acharei Mot 132 which includes same-sex marriages as practices of the Egyptian and Canaanite societies, deemed to be, by Sifra, Acharei Mot 131 and other sources, the most immoral of all societies. It is thus clear within the Torah literature that the practice of same-sex marriage is highly problematic.

Notwithstanding this moral position, is it still proper for Jews to attempt to impose this value – a value emerging from their religious perspective – on the general American society? There are two parts to this question. One is from the perspective of Judaism: should Jews care, halachically, about the moral practices of Non-Jews if such practices have no bearing on Jewish individuals or Jewish society? Presenting an argument that Jews do not proselytise, many people may answer with a simple ‘no’. The answer really is not so simple. While Jews may be restrained in promoting Non-Jews to convert to become Jews, Jewish thought may have a different understanding of the attitude Jews should have in regard to promoting the observance of the Noahide Code amongst Gentiles. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 8:10 seems to clearly outline an obligation upon Jews to promote observance of the Noahide Code amongst Non-Jews. Rabbi Michael Broyde, The Orthodox Forum: Tikkun Olam, The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observances of Noahide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review, however, maintains that Maimonides’ view actually represents a minority position and that the majority of scholars do not perceive an obligation. This, however, does not mean that there is still no religious value in promoting observance of the Noahide Laws amongst Gentiles. One of the important defining characteristics of our forefather Avraham was that he did spread the knowledge of God and the observance of His ways throughout his world. See, for example, Rashi, Bereishit 12:5. It would thus seem proper for Jews to, at least, be concerned about the moral values of the general world and, to some extent, promote values of a universal nature found within the Torah.

There is, however, a second part to this question and that concerns the promotion of Torah values within America which prides itself on the value of freedom of religion, a value that has also served the Jewish community well. There are again two parts to this sub-question, one - the theoretical, the other - the practical. These are both most complex issues and even a preliminary investigation of these matters would be too extensive for this forum. Yet, if we consider the original question, the demand was not to decide whether Jews should be actively against the same-sex legislation or not, but rather to explain why would various Jewish institutions continue to be against it when Jews will not be forced to violate their principles thereby. This question can be answered more concisely. The above sources clearly show that there is a strong view within Jewish thought that Jews are to be concerned about the moral behaviour of Gentiles as defined by the Noahide Code. As such, it should not be surprising to find Jews who would challenge a law clearly contrary to this Code.

The problem, though, is the practical side of this issue. Is it not dangerous to the furtherance of Jewish life in this society to attempt to impose our values on the society for could this not lead to another group attempting to impose their values on society at our expense? If we attempt to stop gays from marrying because of our values, even though it would seem that such behaviour does not actually directly affect us in any way, what argument could we have against individuals attempting, because of their values, to prevent the circumcision of children, terming it ‘male genital mutilation’, even though it does not personally affect them? The very idea of freedom of religion is the allowance to let others follow their value constructs (within certain parameters) – and such a standard has served the Jewish community well. It is actually well known that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein maintained that protecting the Jewish community’s ability to practice Torah in an unhindered manner is more important than siding with a position that may be more in line with our universal ethical standards yet may also possibly hinder this ability. It is for this reason that Rabbi Feinstein instructed Jewish institutions to side with the Pro-Choice camp in the abortion debate because this position will enable Jews to make any such decision with a consideration solely of the halachic criteria while the Pro-Life position may impose other value determinants, contrary to the Halacha. (I am sorry, while this decision is well known and I have heard it stated numerous times, I do not have a non-oral source for it.) So is there not a practical concern with challenging this law given its present parameters?

Those who continue to oppose this law, however, believe that this is precisely the point. Who is to say that the present limitations on the extent of this law will continue into the future? There is a concern that as a moral standard in opposition to Torah strengthens, there is a possibility that these new standards could lead to an eventual direct imposition on Torah standards. When one hears gay activists comparing religious opponents to same-sex marriage to Southern Baptists in the first half of the eighteenth century who opposed the abolition of slavery, this concern would seem to be very real. There is also another concern that the advancement of these values could change the societal milieu, creating subtle and indirect yet problematic circumstances for observant Jews. As such, it is difficult to fully maintain that the advancement of the values in support of same-sex marriage could not eventually be harmful to the lifestyle of Torah committed individuals and their families.

Opponents of same-sex marriage also contend that they are careful to frame their arguments within the context of general moral structures and not Torah per se. In this regard, they maintain that, while they are promoting their religious values, they are, as citizens, simply entering into a general discussion that concerns society as a whole. The issue of when such arguments cross the line of challenging freedom of religion and when they are simply part of the general discussion of a society’s mores is hard to define. Nonetheless, it can be expected that one voicing an opinion in the context of society’s standards will be affected by his/her background and tradition, and the call to discount this reality is simply unrealistic. My objective in this answer is not to express my view on the issue but simply to offer a possible Torah reason for continuing to oppose same-sex marriage. They maintain that, if done in a proper fashion, their opposition is an expression of their Jewish values and in the protection of their rights while simultaneously not challenging their parallel commitment to America’s standard of freedom of religion.

* It should be noted that, technically, one could contend that this statement actually only applies to male homosexual behaviour and that my ensuing arguments are not, as such, applicable to lesbianism. To be honest, there is some basis to this argument yet there is also no doubt that lesbianism is clearly looked upon negatively by the Torah as well. See, for example, Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 20:2. The technical discussion of the distinction in Halacha between male and female homosexuality is, however, an extensive topic in itself and beyond the specific parameters of this issue. As such, we will not elaborate upon it. It is sufficient for our purposes to outline, from these sources, the general attitude to homosexuality and same-sex marriage within Orthodoxy, so that we may respond to a question that touches upon how we are to maintain our ethical viewpoint on this subject in a world in which the general attitude is changing.

Within this question there are actually two inquiries. One concerns the theoretical pinning of the Biblical prohibition of revenge (see Vayikra 19:18); the other concerns the practical application of this concept in this case. Briefly, I will attempt to deal with both.

Two different yet clearly connected prohibitions are actually derived from this verse. One -- recorded in Rambam (Maimonides), Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 304 and Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 241 -- is the more direct one relating to revenge, namely the prohibition of hurting someone simply because he/she hurt you. T.B. Yoma 23a presents, as an example, Person A refusing to lend something to Person B because the latter previously refused to lend something to the former.

The second commandment included in this verse – recorded in Rambam (Maimonides), Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 305 and Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 242 – is of a more indirect nature and is usually referred to in English translation as bearing a grudge. The gemara gives as an example the case when Person A does still lend something to Person B but makes a point of mentioning that this  is unlike Person B who did not lend Person A an item when asked. Sefer HaChinuch points out that the connection of both these prohibited behaviours is the desire to hurt the other in the same manner that this person was hurt. Person A was hurt by Person B because the latter did not lend the former an item. Person A’s motivation for either now not lending Person B an item or lending the item but only after making a point of his/her better behaviour is simply to treat the other badly and/or hurt the other out of grievance. This is what is the essential wrong in both these cases and is at the root of both prohibitions..

In the case of these mitzvot, the nature of this motivation is, thus, of great importance. The previous verse, Vayikra 19:17, informs us that we have a responsibility for our fellow Jew and, as such, we have an obligation to rebuke them, to foster better behaviour in our fellow Jews. If there is a positive purpose in undertaking an action against another, the action does not fall under these prohibitions. So if you say something to another when lending this person an object after he/she did not previously lend you an object, but your objective was not to cause pain but to instruct the other in correct behaviour, with a goal that this instruction will be adopted, you have not violated these commands. It’s the same as hitting another. If you do so because he/she hit you, that’s revenge. If you do so to protect yourself and to stop the other from hitting you, it is not.

As such, it is specifically when an action of a revengeful nature is undertaken to solely cause pain to the other that we encounter a violation of these commandments. An action of this nature undertaken for a positive purpose – whereby the motivation is this positive purpose – does not fall into these categories of sinful revenge. That is why this very same gemara in Yoma states that a Torah scholar who is not vengeful is not a true Torah scholar. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot De’ot 7:13 explains. When a Torah scholar is belittled, especially in public, it is not his/her personal status that is diminished and/or attacked; it is the very honour of Torah itself that is challenged. In this regard, the Torah scholar must take action for the honour of Torah. The motivation is not personal hatred and/or desire to hurt. The motivation is furtherance of Torah. When action that seems to be vengeful is undertaken for a positive purpose, it is not included in these prohibitions. One must, of course, ensure, though, that the true motivation is this positive purpose and that one is not just finding a rationalization for spiteful revenge.

.So, on the surface, it would seem that this boycott of ones boycotting Israel would be acceptable as the purpose is not just to cause pain to the ones who instituted the original boycott but also to try and effect a positive change in, at least, attempting to thwart the original boycott.

There is, though, a further problem. Is this response truly in keeping with principles of justice and the parameters of how we are to act in response to an act of aggression (which this boycott is)? The answer in this case may clearly be no. The ones who instituted the original boycott against Israel are not the ones affected by this boycott for Israel. There is even a question whether the ones affected by this boycott on scotch whiskey can even influence the ones who started the whole matter by boycotting the purchase of books published in Israel. It seems that the real motivation may be to hurt someone because someone hurt Israel. This would even be a case worse than the simple parameters of revenge. In those cases, we critique a motivation to hurt another because he/she hurt you. What would clearly be even worse would be a desire to hurt someone, almost anyone, because you were hurt. That may be the case here. Is this a case where we are so upset with boycotts of Israel that we just want to do something to express our anger and hatred of these boycotts? If so, it would be clearly wrong and any arguments for such an action would have to be seen as only invented to find some means of justifying the action. This is the core of the issue. Is there a real, positive purpose to this action or is it simply a way of expressing anger and hatred? If the former, it could be justified. If the latter, it would not be. 

(It should perhaps also be noted that a further argument could also be made to justify this reactionary boycott in that it would seem that the original Biblical prohibition is solely on taking revenge on fellow Jews. I do not wish, though, to pursue this argument as it, in turn, raises the whole issue of why there should even be a distinction between Jews and non-Jews in this regard or, in fact, in regard to any ethical standard. This further issue, though, is a most complicated one – generally often misunderstood – and beyond the parameters of this question. It should be stated, though, that while this distinction does exist, an argument for vengeance based on such an argument, would still be seen as fundamentally weak for, while technically a distinction between Jew and non-Jew has some basis, the character trait of being a vengeful person is still clearly perceived to be a most negative one. As such, the literature clearly maintains that it should not be part of our base personality in dealing with anyone. The complex question that then arises, as such, is: why would the Torah then clearly demarcate such a law, in any way, as only applying to fellow Jews when, in fact, such behaviour is expected to be rejected universally? This is the question that unfortunately we are not able to pursue at this time.)

This question raises many issues. What actually is the question even asking? Does Jewish thought perceive something unique or special in “sibling rivalry” that demands a specific response? Could the question not just be: how does one deal with any boys, close in age, who are fighting? In any event, could one answer even fit all? How is it possible to give advice, not knowing the personalities of the two boys, their ages, their environment?

            Our starting point should, perhaps, be exactly this, the environment, specifically the environment of the family. While we all desire a close family with strong bonds between its members, this cannot be taken as a given. The entire book of Genesis is a clear indication of this. Close family relations or even emotions cannot be assumed. At most, it can be an objective. Yet, our Matriarch Sarah’s direction to Avraham to send Yishmael away in order to protect Yitzchak (Genesis 21:9-15) also clearly indicates that it is not necessarily an overriding objective.

There is a viewpoint in the Tosephta of Sotah, chap. 6, that could be interpreted as defining the issue between Yismael and Yitzchak as one of sibling rivalry, with Sarah, as the mother of Yitzchak, siding with her son over Yishmael, the son of Hagar. Such a position would seem to even indicate that the import of family harmony is actually limited. This view, however, would seem to be a minority one. Indeed the majority viewpoint, and the one that Rashi quotes, is that Sarah’s concern was the immoral behaviour of Yishmael and the effects such conduct might have on her son. Notwithstanding the value of family harmony, and even against Avraham’s feelings for his two sons, it was the directive of God that our Patriarch should listen to his wife and send his older son away. The lesson is that there is a value beyond family harmony and that must have priority. A goal of family harmony is not enough. There must be a goal beyond family harmony. The further lesson from the Torah may also be that service of this greater goal might actually encourage the development of family harmony.

            We are told of Yakov’s two sons, Yissasschar and Zevulun, who formed a pact whereby the former would devote his life to Torah scholarship while the latter provided for the physical necessities of both (Bereishit Rabbah 72:5). In this way, both would actually gain in that the benefits of the advanced Torah scholarship, in terms of its positive effects on the society and the person, would also be shared. It was the shared goal of both these brothers that brought them closer together.

            Maimonides in his Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 3, in discussing the commandment to love God, states that a person who loves God will also try and encourage the development and expression of this love in others. We can add that such focus will also further the love between human beings. This may be the first advice that the Torah can bring to this situation between these two boys. Present them with a purpose, an objective, a value beyond themselves and in encouraging the necessity of the participation of both, in their own particular way, in the goal, this shared endeavour could bring them closer and lead to more harmony rather than rivalry.

            This is, however, only part of the answer. The challenging, contradictory dialectic of parenting can never be forgotten. We are told that one of the reasons for the enmity between Yosef and his brothers was the special coat (“of many colours”) that Yaakov, their father, gave Yosef. Parents are thus instructed, in T.B. Shabbat 10b, to treat all their children equally. Favouritism for one child, even if not real but only perceived by the other children, can cause friction within a family. The necessary focus, as such, in correcting this situation with these boys may not be on the children themselves but on those around them.

Proverbs 11 22, however, instructs us also to teach the child according to his/her way. The Vilna Gaon comments that this verse is informing us that we must always be cognizant of another’s personality and form our connections with others in line with this. The direction does not solely concern teaching but also the very structure of our relationship. We must, as such, also relate to each child as an individual with uniqueness in our interaction with each of them. Rabbi Shimshon Raphael Hirsch in his commentary to Exodus 25:27, in fact, states that the problems that emerged with Yaakov and Esav could possibly be traced back to the need for Yitzchak and Rivka to have had related to the latter differently, in line with his personality. The task of a parent is, thus, most challenging.  They must, effectively, treat all their children the same, to ensure that there is no perception of a disparity in parental love; yet, parents must also relate to them distinctly, in line with each one’s own unique personality. Intense sibling rivalry may call upon the parents to re-evaluate the way they are interacting with their children – as well as how their children truly understand each other.

Family closeness is not a given; it must be an objective, one which demands effort. A review of the story of Yosef and his brothers (Genesis 37:2 – 45:16), applying the words of  major commentators such as Rashi, will indicate that this whole episode is a lesson in responding to and correcting, if possible, friction within a family. The question is often asked: why did Yosef, on becoming viceroy of Egypt, not send a message to his father that he was still alive? One possibility is that he did not simply wish to re-create the same reality of tension. He wanted to wait for the opportunity to perhaps correct the underlying problems in his relationship with his brothers before re-introducing himself into the family circle. Seeing his brothers before him in Egypt gave him this opportunity. This opportunity must also be sought here.

It is never a simple matter to help our children to trust, with affection in the air and beyond deliberation – still, we can teach patience, insight and the mighty attempt to emulate God.